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Abstract
One of the most important and, at the same time, most controversial issues in 
metasemantics is the question of what semantics is, and what distinguishes 
semantic elements (features, properties, phenomena, mechanisms, processes, 
or whatever) from the rest. The issue is tightly linked with the debate over the 
semantics-pragmatics distinction, which has been vibrant for a decade or two, 
but seems to be reaching an impasse. I suggest that this impasse may be due 
to the failure to recognize a distinct realm that should not be subsumed either 
under  semantics  or  pragmatics,  but  may  be  labeled  "prepragmatics".  My 
ultimate goal is to put forward and defend a novel picture of our language 
architecture, according to which: semantic content is strictly poorer than the 
lexically encoded content  (and therefore does not involve any contextually 
determined material – not even the reference of demonstratives); pragmatic 
mechanisms require being able to reason about one's beliefs and intentions 
and  do  not  affect  truth-conditions  or  truth-value;  and,  fnally,  there  is  a 
distinct  prepragmatic  level,  which  takes  into  account  various  kinds  of 
contextual information and makes it possible to evaluate a sentence (as used 
on a particular occasion) for a truth value. I shall take as a case study, one of 
the  "stumbling  stones"  in  the  semantics-pragmatics  literature:  the  case  of 
demonstrative reference.  The upshot will be to show that if there is indeed 
room for a family of linguistic phenomena that are neither semantic nor yet 
fully pragmatic, the resolution of demonstrative reference is a candidate  par 
excellence to belong there. 
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1.  Semantics vs. pragmatics: what is at issue?
One of the central tasks for metasemantics is to characterize what semantics 
is. The more specifc problem of where to draw the line between semantics 
and pragmatics has received considerable  attention among philosophers of 
language in the past decade.1 The source of the problem is that there seem to 
be  several  equally  plausible  criteria  for  distinguishing  "semantics"  from 
"pragmatics" that converge often, but not always. Those cases in which they 
fail to converge have been of greatest interest to the different parties in the 
debate,  but  equally  well  to  linguists  working  at  the  semantics-pragmatics 
interface. In this section, I start by laying down three main criteria that have 
emerged from the literature, and then raise the issue of what the debate about 
the semantics-pragmatics distinction is really about. In section 2, I propose to 
overcome  the  impasse  posed  by  the  semantics-pragmatics  dichotomy  by 
recognizing a distinct, third area,  which I call  prepragmatics. The last section 
aims to probe this proposal on the phenomenon of demonstrative reference.
It is believed that the frst attempt of carefully distinguishing semantics 
from pragmatics goes back to Morris (1936), who took the former to be the 
study  of  “the  relation  of  signs  to  objects  which  they  denote  and  whose 
properties they truly state” and the latter, the study of “language as a type of 
communicative activity, social in origin and nature, by which members of a 
social  groups  are  able  to  meet  more  satisfactorily  their  individual  and 
common needs” (p. 10).2 Since then, this broad distinction between semantics 
1  A number of collections of articles specifcally on this issue may be mentioned: Turner 
(ed.) 1999, Bianchi (ed.) 2005, Szabó (ed.) 2006, Stojanovic (ed.) 2008, Ezcurdia and Stainton 
(eds.) 2011, to mention only a few.  
2 I am borrowing the quotation from McNally (forthcoming), p. 3.  
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and pragmatics has been seconded by more refned ones. Three main criteria 
appear to have crystalized through the literature. Let us formulate them along 
the following (admittedly rough) lines.3 
(i) The semantic stuff is lexically encoded in the linguistic expressions themselves; 
the pragmatic stuff need not be (and typically is not) lexically encoded. 
(ii) The pragmatic stuff is sensitive to various contextual factors; the semantic stuff 
does not vary from one context to another. 
(iii) The semantic stuff determines the truth conditions; the pragmatic stuff is 
truth-conditionally inert. 
To get a better understanding of the motivations behind the three criteria, 
suppose that in reference to Aisha, I tell you: 
(1) She is obnoxious. 
Suppose that Aisha's behavior makes it obvious that she is obnoxious, so that 
by telling you that she is obnoxious, I am not saying anything informative. 
Presumably, then, the reason for telling you (1)  is not to inform you that Aisha 
is obnoxious. Rather, I might say (1) in order to  convey  something along the 
lines of:
(2) I suggest that we avoid Aisha for the rest of the evening. 
What I would thus convey with (1) – which is what I would have  expressed 
had I uttered the sentence in (2) – is uncontroversially something that is only 
pragmatically  associated with my utterance of (1). And indeed, it falls on the 
pragmatic side according to all three criteria:
(i) the suggestion that we avoid Aisha for the rest of the evening is not lexically 
encoded in the meaning of the sentence uttered in (1); 
3 I shall formulate the criteria as distinguishing semantic "stuff" from pragmatic "stuff": the 
reason for choosing such a jargon term is that at this stage, I would like to stay neutral on 
what it is precisely that the distinction bears upon, and in particular, whether it is abstract 
entities such as elements, features or properties, or rather, more concrete entities such as 
interpretation mechanisms and processes. I shall return shortly.
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(ii) in order to convey that suggestion, I must rely on various contextual factors; 
my interlocutor must reason about what my intentions were in uttering (1), etc.;  
(iii) the suggestion has no bearing on (1)'s truth conditions or truth value: (1) is 
true if Aisha is obnoxious and false if she isn't;4 and this is so regardless of how 
one feels about the question of whether she is to be avoided or not. 
So far so good: implicatures fall out as uncontroversially pragmatic.  But 
now, what would be uncontroversially semantic in our example? Let t be the 
time at which (1) is uttered. One might think (as Grice himself did) that the 
proposition that Aisha is obnoxious at t is what semantics delivers: the semantic 
content,  or  'what is  said'.  After  all,  the implicature that  we'd  better  avoid 
Aisha is arguably derived from the proposition that she is obnoxious, together 
with the general assumption that obnoxious people had better be avoided. 
 Despite the fact that this view, on which pronouns such as 'she' contribute 
their reference to the semantic content, had been implicitly assumed for a long 
time and then became part of our philosophical heritage with David Kaplan's 
infuential  Demonstratives, I submit that the view is far from uncontroversial. 
Indeed, it takes little to see that only on the third of the above criteria does 
Aisha, qua the referent of 'she', fall on the "semantic" rather than "pragmatic" 
side. For one thing, it is not part of the lexical meaning of 'she' that the word 
should stand for Aisha. (If it did, then every time I used the pronoun 'she' I 
would be talking of Aisha, which is absurd.) For another, one clearly needs 
context in order to select Aisha, rather than some other female, as the person 
relevant to the truth of (1). 
Many philosophers' strategy has been to suitably amend those two criteria 
in order to maintain the reference of demonstratives on the semantic side.5 
4 I am ignoring here the fact that "obnoxious" may be an evaluative predicate, hence that the 
truth value of (1) may depend not only on whether Aisha is obnoxious simpliciter, but also on 
from whose point of view her obnoxiousness is being judged.
5 Roughly, as for the 1st criterion, the idea is to say that the mere fact that there is a word, 'she', 
that  appears  to  stand  for  Aisha  and  that  the  lexical  meaning  of  this  word  "invites"  the 
interpreter to search for some female referent are suffcient to render Aisha "linguistically 
encoded" in the sentence in (1). As for the 2nd criterion, the amendment was to make room for 
"semantic contextuality"; that is, for the possibility of appealing to the context in the course of 
semantic interpretation.  Indexicals  are  taken  to  be  those  expressions  whose  characteristic 
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One could speculate that the reason why people have been so reluctant to give 
up the semantic status of demonstrative reference is that the only alternative 
they could envisage is a view on which it would belong to pragmatics. But 
that  was a mistake. The reason why the distinction between semantics  vs. 
pragmatics  raises  a  problem  is,  I  suggest,  because  it  comes  with  the 
underlying assumption that, for a range of phenomena, the phenomenon is 
either semantic or pragmatic, tertium non datur. It is that very assumption that 
I suggest had better be rejected. Before I present my own proposal (sect. 2), 
there is a more pressing concern that I would like to address: what does it 
even mean to say that something (phenomenon, property, process, whatever) 
is  semantic,  pragmatic,  or yet  something else? In other words,  what is the 
semantics-pragmatics debate really about? 
There are at least three ways of understanding the question of what the 
semantics-pragmatics distinction is. The frst would be to see it as a purely 
terminological question. If so, when faced with the fact that our initial criteria 
fail to converge, it becomes a matter of terminological decision which criterion 
to give preference to (if any). Thus if one decides to focus on semantics as a 
study of how linguistic expressions relate to “objects whose properties they 
truly state” (cf. Morris 1936: 10), hence as having to do primarily with how 
language relates to the world and to truth, then one will locate demonstrative 
reference on the "semantic" side, but also many other contextual phenomena 
that affect truth value and that are traditionally not seen as "semantic". Thus 
consider a case of what, depending on one's views, may be seen as a case of 
enrichment or of coercion.6 Consider a situation in which Byeong has been 
feature is precisely that they contribute contextually determined referents to semantic content. 
6 The notion of pragmatic enrichment has its origin in the Relevance theory (cf. Sperber and 
Wilson 1986); for a recent survey, see Recanati (2013). As for coercion, see Pustejovsky (1995), 
as well as Egg (2003) for an alternative to Pustejovsky's proposal.
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doing some works in our house, and I say: 
(3) Byeong hasn't fnished the bathroom yet. 
Whether (3) is true or false will depend not only on the state of the world 
and on what Byeong has or hasn't done, but also on what is at issue in the 
context of (3). If we are talking about how far the plumbing work has gone, 
and Byeong has fnished all the plumbing instalations in the bathroom, then 
(3) will be true, but if we are talking about how far the overall refurbishing 
has gone, and he hasn't fnishing putting the tiles and painting the bathroom, 
then (3) will be false. The upshot of the example is that the sentence in (3) is 
context-sensitive in a way very different from that in which demonstrative 
pronouns are context-sensitive. But if one takes any form of context-sensitivity 
that affects truth value to pertain to "semantics", then the context-sensitivity of 
"fnishing the bathroom" will be a semantic, not a pragmatic phenomenon.
 On the other hand, if one privileges the idea that semantics is about the 
expressions' stable lexical meaning, then one will locate all those contextual 
phenomena – demonstrative reference, enrichment, coercion, vagueness and 
the like – on the "pragmatic" side. And to the extent that it would be a merely 
terminological choice, there would be hardly any point for the two parties to 
argue about who got it right.      
Although I believe that the debate on the semantics-pragmatics distinction 
may have been to a certain extent a terminological debate, I also believe that 
there is more to it. The second way of interpreting the idea of the distinction 
between semantics and pragmatics would construe it as a concrete cognitive 
distinction, namely between two types of cognitive processes that occur in our 
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linguistic  practice,  or  perhaps even as a distinction between two cognitive 
"modules". Putting the idea of modules aside to forestall any controversy, and 
focusing on the idea of two different types of cognitive processes, what would 
the divergence of our initial  criteria  show? It  would simply show that the 
binary distinction between "semantic" vs. "pragmatic" processes is too simple, 
and that the architecture of the different cognitive processes is more complex. 
What is  more,  it  would come as  little  surprise that  the processing of  a 
given  expression, such as a pronoun like 'she', could trigger at the same time 
two different types of processes, such as, for instance, a "semantic" mechanism 
that deals with lexically encoded information and a "pragmatic" mechanism 
that deals with context-dependence. After all, it is taken for granted that such 
a pronoun is also processed phonologically and syntactically, which has never 
been seen as competing with its being also processed "semantically". The idea 
that there is a confict between an expression's requiring both semantics and 
pragmatics only arises if one assumes that once a given expression has been 
semantically processed, it can't require further pragmatic processing.7
The third way of understanding the question of the semantics-pragmatics 
distinction is the most relevant to the debate that has occupied philosophers 
for the past two or three decades. It starts from the assumption that semantics 
and pragmatics are two distinct and separate disciplines, with distinct objects 
of study and distinct theoretical sets of  problems that  they aim to resolve. 
Then  the  question  of  how  to  draw a  line  of  division  between  those  two 
disciplines becomes the question of which are the primary objects of study for 
7 Such an assumption is arguably part of the mainstream view, to the extent that it holds that 
the input to pragmatic processing is the content that results from the semantic processing 
(plus whatever other assumptions about the context and the speaker's belief and intentions).
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semantics  and pragmatics  and which are the theoretical  and the empirical 
questions  that  they  respectively  aim  to  answer.  These  are  metasemantic 
questions, and indeed, among the main questions in metasemantics. 
There is  thus a neat  contrast between the second and the third way of 
understanding the question of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. If seen as 
primarily a question about the cognitive mechanisms at play in processing 
and  interpreting  language,  then  the  issue  of  deciding  which  phenomena 
require "semantic" processing and which require "pragmatics" would rely for 
its answer on psycholinguistics (and more broadly on cognitive science and 
its  recently  emerged  disciplines  such  as  experimantal  pragmatics);  on  the 
other  hand,  if  seen  as  primarily  a  theoretical  question,  then  it  belongs  to 
philosophy of semantics and linguistic theory. 
If we understand the question of the semantics-pragmatics distinction in 
this third way, should it come as a surprise that one and the same expression 
exhibits a behavior that according to some criteria pertains to semantics and 
according  to  other  critaria  to  pragmatics?  Presumably  not.  Take  pronouns 
again.  It  is  well-known that  their  linguistic  behavior  is  of  great  interest  to 
morphology and syntax, and this has never been thought to be incompatible 
with the idea that it should also be of interest to semantics. There is no prima 
facie reason why the relevance of pronouns to pragmatics should confict with 
their being an object of study also for semantics (as well as morphology and 
syntax). One might thus conclude that the reference of pronouns pertains to 
semantics to the extent that it affects the truth value and that it pertains to 
pragmatics to the extent that it involves context-dependence; to think that it 
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pertains exclusively to the one or to the other was a wrong thought to begin 
with.
I believe that a conclusion along those lines is on the right track. My own 
proposal, though, locates the context-dependence of demonstrative reference 
in prepragmatics rather than pragmatics, but despite this difference, it shares 
the spirit of the above conclusion. However, I'd like to point out that such a 
conclusion remains in tension with the mainstream view. Recall that on the 
view that we have inherited from Kaplan, the reference of a pronoun is part of 
the  semantic  content  of  a  sentence  in  which  the  pronoun  occurs.  But  the 
mainstream  view also  embraces  the  Gricean  assumption  that  the  input  to 
pragmatics are semantic contents (or 'what is said'). We thus get something of 
a circle: the semantic content needs to be determined for the pragmatics to get 
started, but at the same time, we need pragmatics in order to determine some 
of the constituents of the semantic content.8 One might think that the obvious 
way out of the circle is to reject the Gricean assumption. Whether or not we 
might eventually want to reject it anyways, my goal in the remainder of the 
paper will be to set out and defend a different proposal. In a nutshell, the idea 
is that there are phenomena that (typically) involve context-dependence and 
(typically) affect truth value, such as the resolution of pronouns' reference, but 
also  coercion,  enrichment  and  quantifer  domain  restriction,  that  neither 
semantics nor pragmatics (as they are about to be characterized) fully account 
for.  Rather,  these  phenomena  motivate  recognizing  a  third,  separate  feld, 
which I shall call prepragmatics. The next section's aim is to explain what this 
feld is and situate it vis-à-vis semantics and pragmatics in a larger picture of 
8 For a similar point, see Korta and Perry (2008).
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our language architecture. In the third and last section, I shall return to the 
topic of demonstrative reference, which I see as a prepragmatic phenomenon 
par excellence.   
 
2. Getting out of the impasse: Prepragmatics
One of the main point of this paper is that the debate over the semantics-
pragmatics  distinction  rests  on a  false  dichotomy.  If  distinctions  are  to  be 
made, then we should look for (at least) a tripartite distinction, one that makes 
room for a separate level of phenomena that, as it were, fall somewhere in 
between semantics and pragmatics,  which I call prepragmatics.  Thus if  we 
look back at the initial criteria for the semantic-pragmatics distinction, it will 
come as little surprise that in some cases, they fail to converge. The reason is, I 
suggest,  that  some  criteria  track  the  semantics  vs.  prepragmatics(-cum-
pragmatics) distinction, while others track the prepragmatics(-cum-semantics) 
vs. pragmatics distinction. Here is an attempt of reformulating the criteria in 
such a way as to regain consistency:
(i) The semantic stuff is lexically encoded in the linguistic expressions; neither the 
prepragmatic nor the pragmatic stuff need be lexically encoded (and typically is 
not). 
(ii) The semantic stuff does not vary from one context to another, while the 
prepragmatic and the pragmatic stuff deploys various contextual factors 
(although in different ways and to different degrees).
(iii) The semantic as well as the prepragmatic stuff may affect truth value and is 
relevant to determining truth conditions, whereas the pragmatic stuff is truth-
conditionally inert.9 
9 To be sure, in some cases the interpreter might need to go through a process of elaborate 
inferential  reasoning before she or he can arrive at something truth-evaluable.  Consider a 
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In the resulting picture, the output of semantics, or what, for simplicity, we 
may call "semantic content",10 is strictly poorer than it is on the mainstream 
picture. Interestingly, it is also strictly poorer than the lexical meaning. There 
may be constraints that are encoded in the lexical meaning that need not reach 
into the semantic content. As we will see in the next section, the constraints 
encoded in the meaning of demonstratives as precisely such. More generally, I 
suggest that the features of number and gender, and other syntactico-lexical 
categories such as tense or mood, are features of lexical meaning that do not 
reach into the semantic content. The criterion (i) thus gives us only a necessary 
condition on what may get into the semantic content.
The criteria (i) and (ii) jointly differentiate the level of semantics from levels 
that are "further up" – that is, from both prepragmatics and pragmatics. But 
what differentiates those two? Under its current formulation, the criterion (iii) 
may be used to test whether some linguistic phenomenon that lies beyond the 
scope of semantics is merely prepragmatic or genuinely pragmatic: if it does 
not affect the truth value at all, as in the case of conversational implicatures 
(as illustrated in the beginning of the paper), then that can serve as evidence 
that that the phenomenon at stake is pragmatic. 
However, it should be pointed out that the criterion (iii) is fairly fragile. 
Firstly, in many cases, there need not be any concensus as to whether some 
phenomenon  affects  the  truth  value  or,  rather,  is  truth-conditionally  inert. 
speaker who says "She is obnoxious" in a situation in which there is no obvious salient female 
referent. Still, by reasoning about the speaker's possible reasons for saying what she said, the 
hearer might come to the conclusion that she must have been talking about, say, Aisha.  
10 Although I continue speaking of "semantic content", I do share certain people's misgivings 
about this notion (see e.g. Yalcin, this volume), which I have myself voiced e.g. in Stojanovic 
(2012): 633-5.
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Controversial cases of this sort are familiar from the debate on unarticulated 
constituents, and more generally from the contextualism-minimalism debate. 
Thus, for instance, if the speaker says "Everyone is tired", most authors hold 
that the truth value of her utterance depends on whether everyone in some 
contextually restricted domain is tired – but there are also authors who hold 
that, strictly speaking, the utterance is true iff everyone tout court is tired, and 
that the contextual restriction on the quantifcation domain only affects what 
is conveyed. Secondly, there may be cases in which the interpreter needs to 
engage in a conscious inference, hence in a genuinely pragmatic reasoning, in 
order  to  arrive  to  anything  truth-evaluable.  Thus,  for  instance,  although 
disambiguation often goes unnoticed, in most cases in which we are aware of 
ambiguity, it is precisely because we will have disambiguated the sentence by 
means of explicit reasoning (e.g. by inference to the best explanation).         
On a more positive note, I submit that whether some phenomenon affects 
truth value or plays a role in determining truth conditions is not the only and 
probably not even the most crucial aspect in which prepragmatics differs from 
pragmatics. Unlike prepragmatic phenomena, such as reference resolution for 
pronouns, pragmatic phenomena, such as conversational implicatures, require 
having  the  concepts  of  belief,  desire,  intention,  and  being  able  to  reason 
explicitly  about  the  speaker's  communicative  intentions,  in  a  way  that 
transpires, for instance, from Gricean maxims. On the other hand, although 
prepragmatic  phenomena  also  require  a  certain  capacity  of  accessing  and 
using contextual  information,  they  do not  require  any similar  higher-level 
metarepresentational capacities. 
Prepragmatics – July 2013 12 Isidora Stojanovic
The  growing  research  in  psycholinguistics  and  other  areas  in  cognitive 
science,  as,  for instance, “clinical pragmatics”(cf.  Cummings 2009) suggests 
indeed that  different cognitive mechanisms are at play when using context 
and contextual cues in determining the reference of pronouns as opposed to 
processing  full-fedged  pragmatic  phenomena  such  as  indirect  requests  or 
sarcasms.  Thus, for example, individuals  diagnosed with Autism Spectrum 
Disorders are generally competent with pronouns but, because of an impaired 
capacity  for  mind-reading,  their  communicative  skills  are  also  relevantly 
impaired, and they are generally unable to grasp contents conveyed over and 
above what is literally said,  let  alone be able  to convey any such contents 
themselves.11   
Evidence  from  language  acquisition  (cf.  e.g.  Clark  2009)  also  speaks  in 
favor of there being (at least) two different types of cognitive mechanisms that 
enable us to expoit the context for the purpose of linguistic exchange. Thus 
children develop certain skills for using context in communication, such as 
the capacity for joint attention, which is crucial for demonstrative reference, 
much earlier than they are able to understand implicatures or irony and to 
master other pragmatic phenomena of the same ilk.
To drive the point home, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to 
abandon the simple model of our language architecture on which once we 
have gone beyond the morpho-syntactic level, everything is either semantic or 
11 See for example De Villiers et al. (2010) or Kissine (2012), and the references therein for the 
empirical results. Kissine argues that the impairment of  the communicative skills of ASDs 
stems from the impaired  capacity  of  taking their  interlocutor's  perspective.  Whatever  the 
correct explanation is,  what matters to the present discussion is that there seem to be two 
different types of cognitive processes, only one of which is impaired in children with autism 
spectrum disorders and which consequently makes them unable to process indirect requests, 
irony and similar fullblown pragmatic phenomena.  
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pragmatic, tertium non datur. To the contrary, I have tried to motivate the idea 
that there is, so to speak, a "third level", which, for lack of a better term, I have 
called prepragmatics. The aim of the next section will be to motivate the idea 
that demonstrative reference belongs there. But demonstrative pronouns are 
not alone in that respect: many other phenomena that have been of interest to 
those linguists working at the semantics-pragmatics interface – for instance, 
sensitivity  to  comparison  classes  (which  we  fnd  with  gradable  adjectives 
such as  'tall'),  coercion  (which  we fnd with 'fnish'),  or  quantifer  domain 
restriction – are also prepragmatic rather than fully pragmatic. However, the 
idea that an expression's behavior pertains to prepragmatics doesn't preclude 
it from also being relevant to semantics as well as to pragmatics. Consider the 
following utterance in reference to Aysha's 8 year old son while he is standing 
among his classmates: 
(4) He is tall. 
Just  as the context-sensitivity of 'he'  and the fact that the speaker of (4) 
uses this pronoun to refer to Aysha's son are to be dealt with at the level of 
prepragmatics, so are the context-sensitivity of 'tall' and the fact that (4)'s truth 
value  depends on how Aysha's  son's  height  compares to the  height  of  his 
classmates. But of course, the adjective 'tall' fully contributes to the semantic 
content of (4): it contributes a certain (relational) property: roughly having a 
height signifcantly above the average height of the comparison class. What is 
more, imagine that (4) is uttered in the discussion of what sport Aysha's son 
should practice. Then the adjective 'tall' is likely to trigger the implicature that 
he should practice basketball. In such a case, one and the same word 'tall' will 
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trigger semantic, prepragmatic and pragmatic processing (plus phonological 
and morpho-syntactic processing). To make room for prepragmatics alongside 
semantics and pragmatics is thus not to think of them competing, but rather, 
as coexisting in happy harmony.
3. Pulling Demonstrative Reference out of Semantic Content 
Let me take stock. I started by presenting three criteria that may be seen as 
having emerged from the linguistic and philosophical literature and that were 
supposed to track the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. For a 
long time, it was assumed that these criteria lined up, shaping up one and the 
same line of division between the two disciplines and, relatedly, between two 
classes of phenomena that are the objects of study of those disciplines. But as 
inquiry progressed and as various phenomena involving context-dependence 
came to be studied in greater detail, the criteria started breaking apart. In the 
previous  section,  I  proposed  a  novel  explanation  of  this  divergence:  the 
different  criteria  do  not  track  a  single  bipartition  between  semantics  and 
pragmatics. I argued that there are phenomena that are neither semantic nor 
yet fully pragmatic, and that are best explained by recognizing a distinct level, 
or a distinct type of phenomena, which I have labeled "prepragmatic". 
My aim in this last section is to provide further support for this idea by 
demonstrating how the phenomenon of demonstrative reference fts into this 
picture.  Recall that on the mainstream, Kaplanian view (briefy recorded in 
sect. 1), indexical and demonstrative pronouns, such as 'I' or 'she', are taken to 
contribute a contextually determined reference to the semantic content (of the 
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sentence, as used in a context, in which the pronoun occurs). My proposal, in 
a nutshell, it to drop this idea altogether. On the alternative that I am offering, 
reference does play a role in determining the truth value (of a sentence, as 
used in a context, in which the pronoun occurs). However, the mechanisms 
that handle reference (and, relatedly, the discipline that studies it) are neither 
semantic nor genuinely pragmatic. Let me start by discussing the very notion 
of direct reference, to then turn back to the question of how demonstrative 
and indexical pronouns work and how they ft into our language architecture.
It is something of a platitude that successful communication requires that 
people should be able to convey information  about other people, about the 
things around them, about events and places. This, in turn, strongly suggests 
that a person should be able to  refer  to those things  directly. Here are some 
examples of what I'd like to propose that we view as paradigmatic cases of 
direct reference. Imagine that we are at a soccer match Barça-Madrid and that 
we have just witnessed Messi scoring a goal. I say: 
(5) Amazing. 
I will be referring to the very event that we have just witnessed, viz. Messi's 
scoring of the goal, and I will be saying of that event that it is amazing. To give 
another example of the same phenomenon of referring directly, imagine that 
you've just taken a sip of a soup and you say:  
(6) Burning hot! 
You will be referring to that very soup and saying of it that it is burning hot. 
Here is yet a third example. A person says: 
(7) I am ready. 
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To determine the truth value of (7), one must know who spoke, and one 
must know what the world is like, viz. whether that person is ready – but of 
course,  one must  also know which action or  event  (7)  is  about;  e.g.  if  the 
person at stake is ready to go for lunch,  but not ready to send off her job 
application, it is crucial to know whether it is the lunch or the job application 
that she is talking about in (7) in order to know whether she is speaking truly 
or not. And this action or event, I take it, is something that has been referred 
to directly.     
Examples such as (5), (6) or (7) illustrate a form of reference that makes it 
possible to talk about a particular thing or event without having to use any 
expression for it, reference that relies heavily on the non-linguistic contextual 
setting in which communication takes place. It is this form of reference that I 
suggest that we view as direct reference par excellence. 
Note  that  in  these  "paradigmatic"  examples,  there  was  nothing  in  the 
sentence uttered that corresponded to the thing or event referred to. However, 
I  do not  want  to  suggest  that  referring is  direct  only when it  is  covert  or 
"unarticulated".12 To the contrary, when people are using pronouns, names, or 
even descriptions,  most often they are still  referring directly.  Importantly,  I 
would like to suggest that in such cases, the "referential" use of the pronoun, 
name or description is parasitic, so to speak, on a more basic mechanism of 
direct reference, which is not brought about by any linguistic, or at least, any 
12 Perry  (1986)  famously  introduced the  notion of  "unarticulated  constituents".  Although 
Perry's main concern is thought rather than language, and in particular the question of how 
our thoughts may guide our actions that bear directly upon objects even when these are not 
represented, several of the cases that he discusses would qualify, or so I believe, as examples 
of paradigmatic direct reference.
Prepragmatics – July 2013 17 Isidora Stojanovic
semantic device. Now, the relationship between direct reference and the use of 
demonstratives may easily lead to confusion. A possible explanation of why 
demonstratives are so often thought to be devices of direct reference is that in 
theorizing about them, philosophers have often focused on uses in which a 
demonstrative pronoun does no interesting semantic or pragmatic work but 
merely appears to “articulate” the reference. Suppose that the following are 
uttered in the same situations in which (5), (6) and (7) were uttered:  
(5*) That was amazing!
(6*) This soup is burning hot!
(7*) I'm ready for it.
These appear to be equivalent ways of expressing the same thing as in (5), 
(6) and (7). Note, though, that (7*) sounds rather odd in situations in which 
the bare “I'm ready” is fne; that is, situations in which there is no antecedent 
for the pronoun 'it' and no event to be contrasted with the one for which the 
speaker claims to be ready. On the other hand, the uses of 'that' in (5*) and of 
'this soup' in (6*) come more naturally, since they are justifed from a purely 
grammatical standpoint. 
To bring the point home, I propose that we view direct reference as, frst 
and foremost, the event of referring directly, an event in which the referring is 
done by the speaker and does not require using any expression that would 
stand for the thing referred to. But when direct reference comes accompanied 
by the use of a demonstrative, the speaker typically uses the latter in order to 
help her audience fgure out what it is to which she, qua speaker, is referring. 
The way in which the meaning of demonstratives helps fguring out what is 
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being referred to is by constraining the range of potential referents by means 
of the lexically encoded constraints. To illustrate the idea, imagine that we are 
at a gathering and that there arrives a couple, Tareq and Aysha. I say:
(8) She is obnoxious.
The 3rd person pronoun 'she' has only a very poor lexical meaning. All that 
is lexically encoded is that the person referred to should be  female. But even 
this information, rather uninteresting in itself, is doing something useful in 
communication. It helps the audience fgure out that it is Aysha rather than 
Tareq that I am referring to, since she is the one who among the things and the 
people to whom I  might  be referring in the situation at stake satisfes most 
saliently the gender constraint associated with the pronoun 'she'. 
The question becomes how such lexically encoded constraints contribute to 
or  interact  with  the semantic  content.  Recall  the  example  of  (5)  in  which, 
referring to the scoring of a goal that we have just seen, I say "amazing." My 
suggestion is that the semantic content in this case is simply the property of 
being amazing.13 The event to which that property is attributed, i.e. the goal 
scored by Messi,  is not part of the semantic content. Rather,  it is that with 
respect to which the content will be normally evaluated for a truth value, just 
as it will be evaluated at a time and at a possible world. 
On a frst approximation, the same story may go for the case in which, in 
reference to Aisha, I say:  
13 Let us, for the sake of simplicity, pretend that there is indeed such a property, and that 
'amazing'  is  a  one-place  predicate  that  applies  to  the  object,  person  or  event  said  to  be 
amazing and does not require any other argument. Beware, though, that this simplifcation 
obliterates the fact that what is amazing for one person need not be amazing for another. In 
other words, it may be more accurate to think of it as a relational property: A football match 
may be amazing for some people without being so for others.   
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(9) She is obnoxious.
 The semantic content associated with (9) would correspond to the property 
of being obnoxious, which, in turn, corresponds to a function that takes an 
individual, a time, a world (and maybe even other parameters, such as e.g. a 
comparison class), and returns True if that individual is obnoxious at that time 
and in that world, and False otherwise. 
But a question immediately arises: what is then going to be the difference 
between the semantic content associated with (9) and that associated with (10) 
below?
 (10) He is obnoxious.
The answer  that  I  shall  give  is  simple:  there  is  no  difference!  Or,  more 
precisely, no semantic difference. For there is obviously some difference in the 
meaning, given that 'she' lexically encodes the requirement that the pronoun 
be used for female individuals and 'he', for male individuals. My suggestion is 
that these lexically encoded constraints need not be  ipso facto  built into the 
semantic content.14 To give a less controversial example of lexically encoded 
constraints that we do not necessarily want to view as  semantically relevant, 
consider formality constraints. For example, in Spanish, the pronouns 'tu' and 
'Usted' are both used for one's addressee, but it is part of the lexical meaning 
of the latter that one uses it to address one's interlocutor formally. However, 
this lexical  difference need not be refected in semantics: from the point of 
14 Alternatively,  one  could  hold  that  pronouns  do  contribute  such  lexically  encoded 
constraints to the semantic content. However, there are a number of complications for such 
proposals,  which  have  to  do  with  embedding  a  sentence  containing  an  indexical  or  a 
demonstrative pronoun under intensional operators (such as various modal, temporal and 
epistemic  expressions)  or  under negation.  See  Stojanovic  (2008):  33-45 for  discussion and 
Appendix (pp. 173-177) for a way of implementing such a proposal formally.   
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view of semantics, 'tu'  and 'Usted' are interchangeable.  The difference may 
still  play  a  useful  role  in  communication.  Consider  a  speaker  with  two 
interlocutors, only one of whom she addresses formally. Whether she uses the 
formal or the informal pronoun has no impact on the semantic content that 
she expresses, but the choice of pronoun may help her interlocutors to fgure 
out whom she is addressing and about whom she is expressing that content.15 
  Going  back  to  (9),  I  suggest  that  its  semantic  content  is  simply  the 
property of being obnoxious. This content, if evaluated at Byeong, would thus 
return True in case Byeong is obnoxious, even though he is male, not female. 
To some, this may seem undesirable. For some might think that it should not 
be  possible  to  say  something  true  about  Byeong,  who  is  male,  using  the 
sentence "She is obnoxious", even if he is obnoxious. While I agree that it is 
not correct to utter (9) in reference to Byeong to say that he is obnoxious, I 
believe that this incorrectness need not be a matter or truth or falsity, or a 
semantic matter at all. I suggest that the lexical meaning of 'she' in (9), that is, 
the gender constraint, intervenes at a different level: the prepragmatic level, 
at which the semantic content may be assessed for a truth value. The role of 
the gender constraint  would then be to indicate that  only individuals who 
satisfy  it  (i.e.  only  females)  may  be  plausibly  taken  as  values  for  the 
parameters at which the content of (9) is to receive its truth value. 
By way of an analogy, suppose that I say (9) in a situation in which, as we 
have been talking about Deeti, Aisha comes in. To determine whether what I 
say is true, you need to evaluate the semantic content associated with (9) – i.e. 
15   The idea that there may be sentential constituents that,  while endowed with a lexical 
meaning, need not contribute to the semantic content, has been received with great sympathy 
in the case of expressive meaning, e.g. for expressions like 'damn'.  Cf. Potts (2005).
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the property of being obnoxious – at an individual, and you have narrowed 
down your choices to Deeti and Aisha, but you still don't know which one to 
give preference to – for you don't know whether I'm talking about Aisha or 
Deeti. Now suppose that, as I say (9), I also make a pointing gesture towards 
Aisha. Then this gesture serves as a device to indicate that it is Aisha, rather 
than Deeti, at which I want you to assess this content for its truth value. So 
then, just as such pointing gestures do not pertain to semantics but intervene 
at a different level, the prepragmatic level, in order to help deciding at whom 
one may plausibly evaluate a content for its truth value, so do the constraints 
lexically encoded in demonstratives and indexicals.   
 
4.  By way of a conclusion
Philosophy of language and philosophy of linguistics have been concerned, 
for the past couple of decades, with the issue of what demarcates semantics 
from pragmatics, an issue tightly concerned with understanding how context 
impacts on meaning, truth and communication. Despite an engaged debate in 
philosophy, as well as considerable advances when it comes to understanding 
various phenomena that lie at the semantics-pragmatics interface (vagueness, 
coercion, scalar "implicature", quantifer domain restriction, and so on), there 
does not seem to be any concensus reached on how and where to draw a line 
of demarcation between semantics and pragmatics. My main aim in this paper 
has been to suggest that this should not come as a surprise, because there is 
more than one line to be drawn. More precisely, I suggested that many among 
the phenomena that have been seen as problematic for the various attempts of 
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pinning  down the semantics-pragmatics  distinction are  precisely  not  to  be 
subsumed either under semantics or under pragmatics. My proposal is that 
we make room, in addition to those two, for what I have called (for better or 
worse) prepragmatics. In the last part of my paper, I used the phenomenon of 
demonstrative reference to probe this idea, arguing (against the mainstream 
view) that reference is not part of the semantic content, yet at the same time 
rejecting the thought that the resolution of reference would be a genuinely 
pragmatic phenomenon, the way that e.g. the derivation of implicatures or the 
interpretation of metaphors are.
In the course of motivating my proposal about prepragmatics, I touched 
upon  another  important  metasemantic  question,  namely,  what  the  debate 
about  the  semantics-pragmatics  distinction is  really about.  Beside  possibly 
being merely a terminological debate, I pointed out two main ways in which 
the distinction may be understood: on the one hand, as a distinction between 
different kinds of cognitive processes deployed in the use of language, and on 
the other, and a distinction between different disciplines as well as different 
theoretical and empirical questions that they aim to answer. Now of course, if 
prepragmatics is to be added to the picture, there will again be two ways of 
understanding how it differs from semantics and from pragmatics. Starting 
from the latter way, the plea for recognizing a discipline that, as it were, sits in 
between semantics and pragmatics should not be received with hostility, as 
there is a growing tendency to use labels like "semantics and pragmatics" or 
"the semantics-pragmatics interface" for a feld in its own right.  As for the 
former way of understanding the distinction(s), the question whether there 
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are indeed cognitive processes that are quite different from those deployed in 
semantic and  pragmatic processing becomes a question for psycholinguistics 
and cognitive science. I believe that there already exists signifcant evidence to 
the effect  that  certain  phenomena,  such as the resolution of  demonstrative 
reference, pattern differently both from semantic phenomena, such as mastery 
and retrieval of a word's stable lexical meaning, and pragmatic phenomena, 
such as sarcasms, metaphors, implicatures. For one thing, certain fndings in 
clinical pragmatics point in that direction;16 for another, research in language 
acquisition suggests similar demarcations. While I am confdent that further 
research in those felds will eventually corroborate the present proposal, my 
more modest hope at this stage is to have offered some theoretical motivations 
for widening the semantics-pragmatics boundary. 
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